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Abstract: Often referred to as the ‘Dutch disease’ economies with resource 
advantages or specific specialisations can be highly resistant to change and as a 
result enter a period of absolute decline. These economies, or industries, very 
specialisation then becomes a barrier to further development when technologies 
and the world economy evolve. This paper critically examines the impact of 
this ‘Dutch disease’ in relation to a case study of the jute textile industry and its 
relationship to the Scottish city of Dundee. The paper however demonstrates 
that this sclerotic behaviour cannot be fully understood without also 
considering the dynamic elements that were also evident in the jute firms as the 
industry diversified out of jute and into artificial fibres. 
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1 Introduction 
The evolution of economies from one set of industrial technologies into a newer more 
advanced set of industrial technologies has been a continuous focus of attention for 
economists and economic historians. Since Adam Smith’s recognition of the advantages 
of specialisation for British capitalism through to Alfred Chandler’s focus upon the 
importance of three pronged investment strategies, or Harry Braverman’s identification 
Author: Please 
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of monopoly capitalism for the rise and dominance of US industrial capitalism in the  
20th century, economic transitions have been a major focus of attention. While progress 
and advance are readily identified, or critiqued in the case of Braverman, failure and 
decline are less well documented. One area where a focus upon problems of development 
have arisen is the suggestion that specific economies, or regions and industries, become 
inhibited to further economic change by a previous set of advantages arising from 
specialisation. Often referred to as the ‘Dutch disease’ economies with resource 
advantages or specific specialisations can be highly resistant to change and as a result 
enter a period of absolute decline. In these economies, or industries, specialisation then 
becomes a barrier to further development when technologies and the world economy 
evolves. 
Institutional economists and political scientists have attempted to locate the drivers 
for the problems of long-run development within the institutional history of capitalist 
development. Douglas North’s reliance upon Schumpterian creative destruction and 
Mancur Olson’s distributional coalitions encouraging the rise of sclerotic economic 
tendencies are two of the common approaches within business and economic history 
(North, 1981; Olson, 2008). In doing so institutional schools of thought have attempted to 
provide an explanation for economic crisis which does not rely upon Marx’s recognition 
of the crisis of accumulation within capitalist development (Harman, 1984). 
This paper examines the impact of this ‘Dutch disease’ in relation to a case study of 
the UK’s jute textile industry and its relationship to the Scottish city of Dundee where its 
production was concentrated. In the case of the jute industry we can identify the classic 
features of sclerotic behaviour. Jute, as with other staple industries of the first industrial 
revolution, saw the role of government increase as the industry suffered from the effects 
of international competition following the increasing levels of industrialisation across the 
world. Thus, as free trade before the First World War gave way to industry-level 
voluntary agreements in the interwar years so direct government intervention developed 
in response to the failure of industry-level voluntary coordination (Scottish Council, 
1961; Lenman et al., 1969; Walker, 1979). The emergence of centralised government 
importation of jute goods by 1939 was understood as a key factor in this process and a 
key factor in the survival of the industry (Tomlinson et al., 2011). The industry also saw 
the emergence of further government initiated policy coinciding with the movement 
towards competition as the government itself withdrew support for price fixing and cartel 
arrangements. The continuation of the government’s role in jute, longer than other 
industries after the Second World War, can again be identified as a feature of this 
‘feather-bedding’ linked to the features of the Dutch-disease (Mercer et al., 1992). 
Finally, Jute was also one of the industries which suffered from the shock of competition 
policy, following the industry’s failure to win support for its collusive agreements at the 
Restrictive Trades Practices Court in 1963 (Howe, 1982). 
In the city of Dundee we can also readily identify the problems associated with the 
Dutch disease. Dundee, and its surrounding area, was responsible for over 90% of the 
industry’s output. As a consequence jute was responsible for some 40% of all 
employment within the city during its heyday. When the industry went into decline so too 
did the city with the result that unemployment levels in Dundee were amongst the worst 
in the UK. For those in work the industry pay rates were also amongst the lowest of all 
manufacturing sectors in the UK. Dundee thus became a city characterised by high 
unemployment and low wage rates. Attempts to diversify the employment patterns within 
the city were pursued from the 1930s onwards but as newer manufacturing industries 
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themselves went into crisis so the longer term history of high unemployment resurfaced. 
It was the failure of these employment encouraging strategies that finally led government 
itself to take a more active role in providing employment by the end of the 20th century. 
This paper examines the role of government support for the jute industry in terms of 
its institutional influence on the firms involved and the consequences this support has for 
our understanding of the Dutch disease. In particular, the paper highlights the inability of 
the institutional literature to understand the important role played by government as the 
jute industry’s firms successfully developed diversification strategies, both in related 
industries and unrelated industries. This support ensured that while we saw the demise of 
the jute industry itself we did not see the demise of the major firms within the industry. 
Instead we see a process more correctly identified as economic transformation rather than 
relative economic decline (Tomlinson et al., 2011). However, ultimately this support was 
incapable of overcoming the wider crisis of competitiveness facing manufacturing 
industry across the UK by the 1970s and as a result government took a more active role 
in maintaining employment within the city by the end of the century by directly replacing 
lost private sector employment. In conclusion, the paper suggests, the case study of jute 
provides a useful example of the role of government in facilitating economic transition. 
As such, jute provides a counter example to the economic arguments against industrial 
policy in a globalised economy; the growth of importance for the price mechanism and 
the market far from negating industrial policy suggests a greater role for government 
within the private sector in order to overcome negative externalities created by initial 
competitive advantages. 
The format for this paper is; first, Section 2 reviews the literature on the rise of 
industrial policy and British economic relative economic decline, and specifically focuses 
upon the economic arguments over government’s action to limit the price mechanism. 
Section 3 briefly outlines the history of the Dundee jute industry after 1945 before 
highlighting the diversification strategies of the two largest manufacturers Jute Industries 
and Low & Bonar. Section 4 then examines the impact of the crisis of the 1970s and 
1980s on both the jute industry and other industries in the city of Dundee. Finally, in 
conclusion, the paper suggests industrial policy played a major role in encouraging the 
transformation of companies out of one industry and into another. 
2 The Dutch disease and industrial policy 
Explaining the demise of industries is arguably of greater importance than explaining 
their growth. The ability of economies to sustain their economic position and the living 
standards of their populations requires a means by which economies can develop and 
manage the transition from one form of economic development to another. Yet our 
understanding of these transitions is limited. The very same explanations for the advance 
of economies is also utilised to explain their failure. Indeed, the Dutch disease is one such 
terminology given to this dilemma. The Dutch disease, named after the 19th century 
relative economic decline of Holland as an early industrial economy, is suggested to arise 
as a result of specialisation and competitive advantage. Economies or regions which are 
capable of achieving a competitive advantage in a specific sector can potentially generate 
higher rates of return compared to other industries and therefore crowd-out investment in 
more diverse industrial sectors. Once, the higher rates of return in the specialised sectors 
are competed away, perhaps by international competition, these economies or regions can 
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then fall into relative decline due to an inability to rapidly develop newer more 
competitive sectors. Work on the deleterious consequences of specialisation is however 
inconclusive. Michaels suggests resource abundance and specialisation may lead to 
economic convergence for economies while Humpreys et al. suggest there may be long-
term costs involved in such specialisation (Michaels, 2010; Humpreys et al., 2007). Much 
of the result is determined by the way in which overhead capital formation, human capital 
and networks of finance and entrepreneurship are understood to be more, or less, 
responsive to increasing competitiveness within the established industries.  
One of the responses to crises of competitiveness within established economies has 
been the development and utilisation of industrial policy by governments. Industrial 
policy has a long and detailed history. Early forms of government regulation of industrial 
development can be dated back at least to the formation of monopoly companies in the 
form of the government sponsored trading companies (Daunton, 1995). More commonly, 
however, industrial policy can be considered to have evolved in the 20th century in 
response to the collapse of free trade and the Great Depression.  
In the UK especially, the development of a ‘managed economy’ from the interwar 
years and extended further, following the successful organisation of industry in wartime, 
into the post-war era marked a new era in government’s role within the private economy 
(Howson, 1975; Middleton, 1988; Peden, 1988). By the end of the 1970s the 
encroachment of industrial policy into the area of the private market was beginning  
to be rolled-back. Government’s growing awareness of the weakness of competition 
within the private sector, drives towards utilising market incentives to enforce efficiency 
and a growing awareness of relative economic decline were all suggested to derive from 
the dominance of industrial policy as a ‘feather-bed’ protecting inefficiency (Cannadine, 
1997, pp.261–284). A low productivity consensus in which strong labour organisation 
colluded with a conservative management to prevent economic efficiency is suggested to 
have characterised the UK economy (Elliott and Atkinson, 1999, p.36). As such industrial 
policy was now increasingly being described within a ‘declinist literature’ as a cause 
rather than a cure for market failure (Bean and Crafts, 1996, pp.131–172; Broadberry and 
Crafts, 1996, pp.65–91; Barnett, 1972). 
One of the original contributions to the declinist school of thought came from Bacon 
and Eltis (1978, pp.92–116) who suggested that government policy increasingly 
‘crowded-out’ scarce resources out of a productive traded sector. Growing government 
involvement in the private sector is suggested to have created a crisis of demand whereby 
private investment was unable to compete, ‘crowded out’, by an ever increasing demand 
for resources by the public sector. Part of this crowding-out arose from an implicit  
post-war social contract between labour, government and employers. These rational 
choice views suggest the commitment to high welfare expenditure acted as a quid-pro-
quo for governments’ minimalist approach to competition policy within the private sector 
(Bean and Crafts, 1996, pp.140–142). Broadberry and Crafts, while acknowledging the 
short term benefits of the post-war consensus, maintain that the “post-war settlement and 
gradualist approach to the transition from war to peace had long-run costs in terms of 
forgone productivity” (Broadberry and Crafts, 1996, p.42). In the long-run, in the British 
case, an institutionalised weakness emerged whereby market-based incentive structures 
reduced the requirement to focus upon rapid productivity growth (Crafts, 1993, p.49). 
The absence of any alternative mechanisms for the destruction of these institutional 
limitations upon growth itself then led to further path-dependent sub-optimal choices.  
In Eichengreen’s work market failure occurs due to coordination problems, itself arising 
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from market failures embedded within the institutional failure generating weak market 
signals. As a result economic actors are unable to establish new markets to satisfy latent 
demand or supply and innovation is undermined (Eichengreen, 1996, p.217). Britain is 
then suggested to have developed a damaging circularity in which distributional 
coalitions and cosy post-war deals restricted possibilities of growth and entrenched 
economic sclerosis (Olson, 1965; Broadberry and Crafts, 1996, p.86). 
An alternative approach suggests that the British experience of post-war relative 
economic decline derived not from industrial policy per se but from the economy’s 
inability to transform itself along either the path of the most market-focused economy, 
the USA, or the more statist economies in Western Europe (Shonfield, 1965; Hall and 
Soskice, 2002; Jullien and Smith, 2011, pp.358–383). The ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
literature is the latest form of this literature whereby a focus upon the institutional failures 
of government, employers and labour within the British economy provides the 
explanation for the low productivity, high wage and social contract consensus resulting in 
relative economic decline. Zeitlin and Trubeck (2003), within this literature, extend this 
argument further by suggesting that alternative, government led, institutional forms are 
available within the contemporary form of global capitalism for the regulation of work 
and welfare.  
The Dutch disease is thus rooted in institutional understandings of economic 
development. Much of this analysis is also combined with a focus upon an apparent 
failure to develop managerial capitalism with firms’ inability to gain access to capital for 
investment, due to imperfect capital markets, to create a specific ‘Anglo-Saxon’ form of 
capitalist development (Hall and Soskice, 2002). Irrespective of ideological approach to 
Government’s increasing role within the private economy is thus central to explanations 
of British economic development. This is especially true of the growth of industrial 
policy in the 20th century in discussions of economic management, productivity 
shortcomings and ultimately relative economic decline, where it becomes an explanatory 
factor for relative economic decline. From popular accounts of writers such as Barnett 
and Hutton to more academic studies including Broadberry and Crafts, Cairncross, 
Phelps-Brown and Tomlinson industrial policy continues to play an important yet 
contentious part in these debates (Tomlinson, 2000). 
Within the economics literature a similar set of ideas can be found in which  
market distortions, arising from trade policies, are said to have acted to fetter the  
price mechanism. Monopolistic rent-seeking and dead-weight social losses arise due to 
government intervention placing limits upon the price mechanism. Within economics 
there is some dissent over this neo-classical approach. In the 1980s ‘New Trade Theory’ 
highlighted the role of market failure within capital markets as a justification for the 
continued role of industrial policy. Nevertheless, although government intervention was 
now justified in terms of ‘complex trade policies’, namely defending infant industries, 
introducing minimum labour standards or counter-acting unfair terms of trade, industrial 
policy still remained a second best solution with reference to free trade (Krugman et al., 
2012, pp.258–263). Today industrial policy, within a free-trade environment, has a focus 
upon government’s role in the development of comparative advantage through supply 
side reforms. Industrial ‘clusters’ of factors of production are, it is suggested, capable of 
achieving industrial economies of scale and scope arising from agglomeration effects 
external to the firm, for example in the form of human capital acquisition within the 
labour process deriving from specialisation (Audretsch, 2000, pp.63–81). 
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The jute industry, as we will now seek to highlight, provided government with an 
example of such a complex trade policy. How could welfare and employment be 
protected in a highly specialised local economy when moving from protectionism to free 
trade? It was to prove a more complex trade problem than was to arise in the case of other 
staple industries such as cotton, coal or shipbuilding precisely because of the institutional 
context in which these industries had emerged.  
3 Managing the decline of jute 
Jute, an industrial textile of the first industrial revolution, was used extensively in 
bagging, sacking and rope manufacture. It was therefore a textile of great significance  
for the transportation of bulk goods such as food stuffs and building materials  
from the 19th century onwards. Dundee’s jute industry, accounting for over 90% of UK 
output, was an industrial cluster where external economies of scale generated significant 
comparative advantages in its early years. Jute was a leading sector in the 
industrialisation of Scotland in the 19th century generating large financial profits which 
were reinvested in the expansion of the domestic industry or transferred into finance 
capital through the development of Investment Trusts. However, by the early 20th 
century its relative decline was evident. The history of the decline of the jute industry is a 
classic case of a staple industry of the first industrial revolution. International competition 
brought with it a rapidly falling share of world markets, falling market share led to low 
levels of domestic investment and the resultant high levels of domestic unemployment for 
jute workers by the interwar years. The First and Second World Wars provided a return to 
profitability but this was only temporary with the return of international competition from 
the 1920s and again the 1950s as world markets re-emerged. Thus the post Second World 
War international competition, from within the Commonwealth, represented the return of 
competitive pressures which had been in existence since before the First World War 
(Walker, 1979; Stewart, 1998). 
Government support for the industry in the form of ‘Jute Control’, introduced shortly 
before the outbreak of the Second World War, utilised government’s centralised buying 
and price fixing arrangements to provide the institutional stability for the industry after 
1945 until these supports were weakened from 1957 and eventually abolished in 1969. 
This institutional support was the key difference with the interwar years and permitted a 
slow managed contraction of the industry to take place in contrast to the collapse which 
had been apparent in the 1920s and 1930s. Between 1958 and 1963 the number of firms 
fell from 64 to 44, while the number of factories fell from 89 to 76 (UK Census of 
Production, 1963, 79, table 1). However, while rationalisation of production took place it 
was not the case that the industry itself was contracting, rather the industry was becoming 
more specialised in higher value outputs. With the exception of production of low value 
jute yarn, Census of Production data indicates that output was either static or even rising 
in specific areas. Hessian twill used in the carpet industry, linoleum quality hessian and 
other woven cloths together saw small increases in output from 1,331 to 1,478 cwt tons in 
weight between 1958 and 1963, and a large expansion, of 65% in nominal values 
occurred in the still more specialised areas of production in jute tow, pulled, dyed and 
carded jute products (UK Census of Production, 1963, 79, table 5). 
The growth of specialised jute product markets however encouraged a further 
intensification of the competitive threats from international producers; output of hessian 
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twill for carpets, hessian for linoleum and other woven cloths had by 1968 fallen 53% by 
quantity from the 1963 levels. Smaller falls were also occurring in the more specialised 
areas of dyed, carded and jute tow (UK Census of Production, 1968, 102, table 1 and 
(1971), PA415, table 1). As a result a second wave of rationalisation was to take place 
between 1969 and 1972. Firm’s initial response in this later wave was to close plants and 
concentrate production. But this concentration of production itself gave way to 
amalgamation and merger, rationalisation and exit from the industry (UK Census of 
Production, 1968, PA415, 1972, table 1). 
While the above indicates that the jute industry faced many of the traditional features 
of staple industries, and can readily be encompassed within the Olsonian framework of 
sclerotic institutional decline, not so readily understood is the fact that it was also in this 
period that jute firms themselves can be identified as rapidly adopting dynamic strategies 
of diversification out of jute.1 
In 1968 while artificial fibres amounted to under 2.9% of output by 1972 output of 
polypropylene alone accounted for over 27% of gross output and was the single largest 
commodity output of the industry, by quantity.2 It is this diversification out of jute and 
initially into polypropylene and then into unrelated industries that is of particular interest 
here in relation to economic transformations and the Dutch disease. The two largest 
companies Jute Industries and Low and Bonar were at the forefront of these changes and 
it is to their experience that we now turn. 
Jute Industries Ltd, formed in 1920 as a holding company, was the largest of the 
Dundee jute manufacturers (Guildhall Library (hereafter GL), Stock Exchange Yearbook, 
1950, p.2449). In the first wave of rationalisation within the industry, in 1966, Jute 
Industries sought to centralise production through a reorganisation of production  
and creation of a single, and distinct, textile manufacturing division (GL, 1967, p.265). 
Simultaneously, Jute Industries was also beginning its diversification out of jute. The 
management of Jute Industries recognised that the USA was responsible for providing  
the impetus for its diversification into artificial fibres. It was argued that as US industry 
was “not keen on placing reliance on outside sources of raw materials”, manufacturers of 
tufted carpets were keen to develop an alternative to jute, which could be produced and 
controlled within US borders (Sidlaw Industries, Company announcements, Dundee 
University Archive, (hereafter DUA), MS 66/10/15/2/1, 28th March 1980). In order to 
combat the threat posed by this Jute Industries began research and development into the 
possibility of weaving polypropylene plastic tapes for use as a backing cloth in the tufted 
carpet industry.  
The second largest of the Dundee jute manufacturers Low & Bonar, formed out of a 
merger in 1912 and becoming a publicly limited company in 1947, followed a similar 
path to that of Jute Industries (Low & Bonar, Company Brochure, 1950). By the middle 
of the 1950s Low and Bonar was moving into the production of plastics for 
waterproofing tarpaulins and early cellulose production of film for packaging (Howe, 
1982, p.74). 
The simultaneous movement by the two largest jute manufacturers into related 
textiles was further formalised when in 1966 the two companies officially joined forces 
to form Polytape Ltd for the extrusion of polypropylene tapes and Synthetic Fabrics 
(Scotland) Ltd for the production and marketing of woven polypropylene fabrics. The 
formation of these two companies ensured Jute Industries and Low & Bonar continued to 
retain a large share of the domestic British market for primary tufted carpet backing as 
well as exports. Thus although polypropylene was a substitute for jute in carpet backing 
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the two companies were capable of continuing to dominate the market and prevent new 
entrants (Low & Bonar, 1981). 
Polypropylene was to become a related diversification of an entirely different 
magnitude to earlier diversifications. As Craig et al., suggests it was responsible for 
transforming Dundee’s “highly concentrated industry, based upon one product, into a part 
of a national textile industry” (Craig et al., 1980, p.9). As the data from the Census of 
Production described above indicates the two companies, and other competitor jute 
companies, rapidly understood the significance of synthetic fibres for the textile market. 
The two joint ventures, Polytape Ltd. and Synthetic Fabrics Ltd. would together play a 
prominent role in the development of artificial fibres for both Jute Industries and Low 
and Bonar.  
By 1971 the management of Jute Industries, now renamed Sidlaw Industries to 
emphasise their movement out of the jute industry, had as its main focus diversification 
away from jute. The chairman, Sir John Carmichael, informed employees in Sidlaw 
News that diversification was now “the name of the game”. While referring to the 
company’s “major role in jute” and their hope that it would ‘make progress’ he ‘pointed 
out that things changed and that industry had to change with them (Sidlaw News, 1972). 
By 1972 jute was now a minor part of the organisation (Sidlaw Industries, 1972).  
In March 1972 it acquired the Aberdeen Service Company, a private partnership 
exploiting first mover advantages of opportunities in providing services for the 
exploration and drilling companies operating in the North Sea (Sidlaw Industries, 
Company announcements, 1984). Thus Jute Industries became an important early 
investor in the development of services for the North Sea oil industry. 
For Low and Bonar the movement out of jute came from opportunities in related 
diversification. In 1977 it launched Flotex, a synthetic carpet manufacturing subsidiary, a 
venture described as the company’s “new direction in textiles” (DUA, MS 24/1/7/1/3, 10 
May 1979. 4 May 1982, DUA, MS 24/1/7/1/6). Low & Bonar were thus, increasingly 
focused upon diversification, as they suggested “constantly looking for new 
opportunities” in areas which it had not previously operated (DUA, MS 24/1/7/1/3, 10 
May 1979. 4 May 1982, DUA, MS 24/1/7/1/6). Once this process of diversification had 
begun Low and Bonar’s, as with Jute Industries, range of textile interests was almost 
unlimited such that by 1986 Bonar Textiles were applying their knowledge to a range of 
applications for non-woven textiles ranging from nappies, sanitary napkins, hospital 
masks and hats and durable products ranging from wall-coverings and blankets to inner 
linings for clothing and artificial grass surfaces for sports and display areas. 
The experiences of Jute Industries and Low and Bonar do not fit neatly within the 
institutional focused theories of decline and the Dutch disease which fails to recognise 
the continuing dynamic element of capital accumulation. These dominant firms were 
capable of utilising their acquired production-based knowledge to move out of traditional 
textiles and into the related industries of artificial fibres and specialist location-based 
knowledge, particularly in the case of Jute Industries, to develop unrelated diversification 
strategies in services for a newly developing sector.  
4 From industrial policy to employment policy 
While the dominant jute firms may have proven to be much more flexible and dynamic 
than the Dutch disease or wider ‘declinist’ literature implies the costs of this continuing 
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dynamism were borne by the less than mobile working population located in Dundee. 
Industrial policy had seen a widening of industrial employment in Dundee throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, such that by the end of the 1960s large-scale employment had been 
provided by a number of multi-national companies. Manufacturing and assembly work 
was to be found in a range of companies, most notably National Cash Register, Levi 
Jeans, Mitchelin and Timex (Hood and Young, 1982). The difficulty for the city lay in 
the fact that the crisis which decimated the remnants of the jute industry in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s also had a major negative impact on the newer industries. The result was 
that high levels of unemployment returned to Dundee for the first time since the 1930s 
and remained throughout the period from the 1970s to the 1980s.  
Government policy increasingly became less one of protecting and encouraging 
private sector employment and instead became one of acting as the employer of last 
resort. The public sector saw employment in the city replace that of the jute industry, not 
to mention that of the newer industries as the basis for assembly and low skill labour 
declined. As Table 1 below shows whereas almost 40% of employment before the 
Second World War had been in the jute industry by the beginning of the 21st century this 
had declined to zero. By contrast while public sector employment prior to the Second 
World War was below 5% by the 21st century this had risen to the levels of importance 
jute had originally had at almost 40%. 
Indeed, as Tomlinson shows in his paper in this volume this expansion of public 
sector employment came in the areas of health, public administration and education 
resulting in the first time in a substantial base for higher skill employment, something the 
private sector had never achieved (Table 1). 
Table 1 Dundee employment in jute and the public sector 
 Dundee population 
Insured population 
employed in jute (%) 
Population employed in 
public sector (%)** 
1938 178,000 38.1* 3.4 
1951 177,333 18.4 5.8 
2006 142,170 0 38.5 
Sources: Dobson and Partners (1952) and Appendix 4;  
 Tomlinson et al. (2011), tables 7.2 and 7.4 
Government’s importance for employment, and living standards, within this framework 
needs to be understood in its totality rather than in relation to a specific industry or area. 
While industrial policy went into abeyance from the 1970s onwards it was replaced by 
the public sector as employer of last resort. We can suggest that institutional approaches 
focusing upon one industry, or one policy, thus requires a wider understanding of the role 
played by government within an economy if we are to gain a fuller picture of the 
consequences of institutional change.  
5 Conclusion: a continuing role for industrial policy? 
In the case study above we have examined the extent to which ideas linked to the Dutch 
disease, or a wider ‘declinist’ literature, fails to understand the totality of the changes 
undergone within the British economy through the 20th century. 
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By examining a classic example of the first industrial revolution, the jute industry 
which was a staple industry, we have been able to demonstrate that first firms’ histories 
require a wider appreciation of the diversity and development of large organisations. The 
leading jute manufacturers, in response to increased competition within their established 
market, were capable of developing highly diversified strategies. These firms do not fit 
within a characterisation of being simply conservative or complacent. Instead they readily 
responded to opportunities as and when they arose. Indeed we can go further and suggest 
that without the support of industrial policy, ‘feather-bedding’, the firms themselves may 
not have survived long enough to be able to take advantage of the opportunities emerging 
by the 1960s and 1970s. As Jute Industries stated the timing of the movement into 
polypropylene was one dictated by the market opportunities, in particular the demand for 
synthetic carpet backing in the US market and in the case of the Low and Bonar’s 
concentration upon the specialist synthetic textile market from the late 1970s again arose 
from the newly developed technologies of artificial fibres. Unrelated diversification 
strategies emerged still later with opening up of the North Sea for oil exploration in the 
later 1970s. While Booth, still working within the declinist school but from a more 
sympathetic stance, suggests that the British economy may have benefitted from a more 
rapid process of industrial transformation we would still have to suggest that it is not 
clear, at least in the case of jute, that the opportunity for this transformation was available 
prior to the 1960s (Booth, 2001, p.87). 
The second conclusion we can draw from this case study is that in relation to the 
continuing role of government within the economy. Most significantly our study suggests 
government continues to play a major role in facilitating economic transitions. Industrial 
policy was perhaps more successful in facilitating the industry’s transition from one 
sector to another rather than in its defence of a static industrial structure. In an 
increasingly globalised world where industries can both emerge and disappear rapidly 
such a role in managing economic transitions may be more important than ever. 
However, our case study suggests that ultimately the ability of firms to maintain their 
strategies for accumulation were underpinned by government as employer of last resort 
rather than through industrial policy. 
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